Kuzul

Range Factor is a measurement of a defensive player’s range. It is a simple statistic that is calculated by adding a fielder’s put outs and assists, multiplying that number by nine and dividing the result by games played.

Derek Jeter is rated as an average defensive player by some “experts.” Others consider him to be and to have been below average.

Range Factor for an infielder is dependent upon the number of ground balls put into play. Maybe, I hoped, that if they didn’t hit many ground balls, I could rationalize Jeter’s RF.  A batter that strikes out doesn’t hit a ground ball.

The following table lists Jeter’s Range Factor and the number of strikeouts New York Yankees pitchers recorded from 1996-2001:

 
YEAR    SO    RF

1996    1139    3.81      
1997    1165    3.90      
1998    1080    3.61      
1999    1111    4.45      
2000    1040    3.78      
2001    1266    4.05      
2002    1135    4.52      
2003    1119    3.81      
2004    1058    3.74      
2005    985      4.00      
2006    1019    4.25      
2007    1009    4.46      
2008    1141    4.12      
2009    1260    4.14      
2010    1154    4.02      
2011    1222    4.76      

During Jeter’s career, Yankees pitchers averaged 1,118 strikeouts a season. Jeter’s Range Factor was 4.10.

In 2002, Jeter’s 4.52 RF was the best of his career. The Yankees struck out 1,135 opposing batters. 

Jeter’s lowest RF occurred in 1998, when Yankees’ pitchers recorded 1.080 strikeouts.

A Pearson R reveals that the correlation between Jeter’s RF and Yankees’ pitchers’ strikeouts for his career is only 0.188. There is only a small correlation between the two.

Another variable is a pitching staff’s ratio of ground ball outs to fly ball outs. The following table shows Jeter’s RF and Yankees’ pitchers GO/FO ratio.

 YEAR     RF    GO/FO

1996    3.81    1.08      
1997    3.90    1.18      
1998    3.61    1.06      
1999    4.45    1.06      
2000    3.78    0.93      
2001    4.05    1.00      
2002    4.52    1.00      
2003    3.81    0.80      
2004    3.74    1.03      
2005    4.00    1.14      
2006    4.25    1.01      
2007    4.46    1.01      
2008    4.12    1.09      
2009    4.14    1.01      
2010    4.02    1.01      
2011    4.76    1.04     

In 2002, Jeter’s RF was 4.52. The Yankees’ GO/FO ratio was 1.00, which means pitchers recorded the same number of ground ball outs as fly ball outs. This reveals nothing.

The correlation between Jeter’s RF and the ratio of ground outs to fly outs is .062, which is even less than the correlation between Jeter’s RF and Yankees’ pitchers’ strikeouts.

Finally, here are the career Range Factors of some other Yankees shortstops:

PLAYER    RF      

Phil Rizzuto    5.13      
Tony Kubek    5.09      
Bucky Dent    4.94      
Tommy Tresh    4.85      
Alvaro Espinosa    5.04      
Fred Stanley    4.60      
Gene Michael     5.30     

I would never denigrate Derek Jeter, but as my mother used to say, “If everybody says you’re sick, go to the doctor.”

It’s difficult to admit, but maybe some of those that don’t think Jeter has been anything more than an adequate defensive player are right.

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With the 2011 professional baseball season a distant memory and spring training 2012 still a few weeks away, baseball’s around-the-clock television channel known as MLB Network has been angling for a new way to generate offseason ratings.

Enter Baseball IQ, MLB Network’s new series all about baseball trivia.

The concept is simple: 32 participants, including a front-office staffer from all 30 MLB teams, one person from MLB.com and another from the National Baseball Hall of Fame in Cooperstown compete in a tournament bracket through four rounds of MLB historical trivia, all in the name of crowning the most knowledgeable employee in all of baseball and donating a total of $190,000 to various team charities.

To determine which staffer would have the honor of representing each club, all 32 teams launched an internal trivia challenge, with the best performer winning the chance to fly to MLB Network headquarters in Secaucus, New Jersey, to participate in Baseball IQ.

The Diamondbacks sent dbTV Graphics Supervisor Josh DeFamio, who is playing for the Arizona Diamondbacks Foundation.

A native of Camden, New Jersey who added to his knowledge of East Coast teams upon moving west to attend Arizona State University, DeFamio explains his fascination with baseball statistics: “I’ve always been good at remembering stuff, remembering lists. Categorizing memories. Baseball seemed perfect for that kind of stuff.”

DeFamio worked for the Diamondbacks, Philadelphia Phillies and scoreboard manufacturer Daktronics before returning to Arizona prior to the 2008 season, where he has been ever since.

DeFamio won his Round One matchup against Houston Astros ticket sales representative Ben Coburn when Coburn was unable to name nine of the 20 players with the most career stolen bases since 1901.

The final score of DeFamio’s Round One game was Diamondbacks 20, Astros three.

DeFamio next faces off against Cincinnati Reds scoreboard operator Rich Linville, who defeated Pitsburgh Pirates account manager Steve Morse in his first-round matchup.

MLB Network has not yet announced air dates for Round Two.

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For the last few years, it has been common to present a pitcher’s strikeouts to walks ratio when attempting to evaluate effectiveness or potential. It is simply another tool that is used, but it is one of the weakest of all statistics.

A major reason is that batters’ strikeouts are now considered “just another out,” which is patently false. The exceptions are when a batter leads off an inning or is at the plate with two outs.  With one out, only a double play is usually, but not always, worse.

Batters now, unlike those of the past, don’t consider striking out shameful. Most of today’s hitters accept a base on ball with great reluctance.

In 2011, American League teams averaged 1,113 strikeouts and 499 walks. The ratio of strikeouts to walks was 2.23 to 1.

National League teams averaged 1,181 strikeouts and 502 walks. The ratio of strikeouts to walks was 2.35 to 1.

Justin Verlander was the best pitcher in the American League. He had 257 strikeouts compared to 57 walks for a 4.51 strikeouts to walks ratio.

Clayton Kershaw won the 2011 Cy Young Award. He struck out 248 batters and walked 54 for a strikeouts to walks ratio of 4.59.

Now comes the important part.

Verlander’s 257 strikeouts equal 23.09 percent of an average AL team’s strikeouts. Presented simply, if Verlander faced only one team in each of his starts, his strikeouts would account for 23.09 of the team’s strikeouts.

Now let’s return to Bob Feller’s 1946 season. Rapid Robert set a record by striking out 348 batters. He walked 153, which was pretty decent for him. Imagine any pitcher walking 151 batters in a season today.

Feller’s strikeouts to walks ratio was 2.27 to 1 compared to Verlander’s 4.51 to 1 ratio.

In 1946, American League teams averaged 653 strikeouts and 550 walks. As Phil Rizzuto would say, “Holy cow.”

American League teams had a strikeouts to walks ratio of 1.19 to 1.

Do you want to know why? It was a disgrace for a hitter to strikeout and most batters would eagerly accept a walk.

Feller’s 348 strikeouts represent an amazing 53.29 percent of the average 1946 AL team’s strikeouts.  His 153 walks represent an equally amazing 27.81 percent of the average team’s walks.

The New York Yankees’ Eddie Lopat, a contemporary of Feller, struck out few batters. Known as the “Junkman,” Lopat won 21 games in 1951 with 93 strikeouts and 71 bases on balls for a strikeouts to walks ratio of 1.31.

Lopat relied on guile and luck for his outs. He was the ultimate “contact pitcher” so his strikeouts reveal little. That is also true of his strikeouts to walks ratio.

This graphically illustrates the fact that presenting only a pitcher’s strikeouts to walks ratio is almost meaningless unless it is provided within a context.

How many innings were pitched?  How many strikeouts did the pitcher have for every nine innings? How many walks did he have per nine innings? How do his strikeout and walk totals compare to the league averages?

By the way, there used to a journeyman pitcher named Dick Hall. Originally an outfielder, Hall couldn’t hit enough to stay in the big leagues so he turned to pitching.

In 16 seasons, the now 81-year-old right-hander averaged 89 strikeouts a season. He ranks ahead of Justin Verlander, Tim Lincecum, Felix Hernandez and Roger Clemens in career strikeouts to walks ratio.

Hall’s career strikeouts to walks ratio is 3.14 compared to Verlander’s 2.96, Lincecum’s 2.97, Hernandez’s 2.98 and Clemens’ 2.96.

Let’s return to Phil Rizzuto. “Holy cow.”

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Ty Cobb won the triple crown in 1909. He batted .377, hit nine home runs and drove in 107 runs.

Yes, it certainly was the dead-ball era when nine home runs leads the league.

In 1909, American League teams averaged 3.44 runs a game. In 2011, American League teams averaged 4.46 runs a game. Yes, it still is the lively ball era.

One result of the lively ball era is that Cobb is slightly underrated as an offensive force.

Cobb ranks at the top of many offensive categories when one uses traditional statistics.

His .366 batting average is the best ever; he ranks ninth, with a .433 on-base percentage; he slugged .512 and is fifth with 5,854 total bases. Until Pete Rose broke his record, Cobb was first with 4,189 hits.

Cobb is second in runs scored, with 2,246, which is remarkable considering that runs were at a premium for most of his career.

Cobb is fourth in doubles, second in triples, seventh in runs batted in and fourth in stolen bases.

Until the late 1960s, Cobb was considered the greatest player in history. With the passage of time, that honor now belongs to Babe Ruth.

Now to the fun part.

I do not know how Cobb fares when one evaluates his career using modern statistics. We are going to find out.

Cobb ranks third in lifetime WAR (wins above replacement), with 159.4. Ruth leads with 172.0, followed by Barry Bonds’ 171.8.

Cobb is second in offensive WAR, with a 156.0, compared to Ruth’s 164.6. Cobb’s defensive WAR (dWAR) has not been determined since the relevant data are complete only since 1974.

The leader in dWAR is Brooks Robinson, with a 27.3, followed by Andruw Jones’ 23.9.

RAR purports to measure the number of runs better a player is when compared to a replacement player.

Cobb has a career RAR of 1,463, with a high of 112 in 1909. Ruth has a career RAR of 1,739, with a high of 147 in 1923. In eight different seasons, Ruth had a RAR better than Cobb’s best of 112.

Ruth is clearly the better offensive player, but let’s examine how their eras affected some of the numbers.

Cobb scored 2,246 runs, averaging about 94 runs a season. He batted in 1,938 runs, averaging 81 RBI a season. He led the league in RBI four different seasons.

During Cobb’s career, American League teams scored 124,854 runs, an average of about 5,202 runs a season.

Dividing Cobb’s 2,246 runs by the league’s 124,854 runs scored reveals that Cobb scored 1.8 percent of the league’s runs during his career.

Dividing Cobb’s 1,938 RBI by the league’s 124,854 runs scored reveals that Cobb batted in 2.6 percent of the league’s runs.

Since Ruth was a pitcher who could have been voted into the Hall of Fame had he remained a pitcher, we will use 1919-34 for him.

During those 16 seasons, Ruth scored 2,062 runs, averaging 129 runs a year. He batted in 2,085 runs, averaging 130 RBI a season. Ruth led the league in RBI in six of those years.

From 1919-34, American League teams scored 96,830 runs, an average of 6,052 runs a season.

Ruth scored 2.1 percent of the league’s runs from 1919-34. He batted in 2.2 percent of the league’s runs.

Player   Runs  RBI

Cobb       1.8    2.6

Ruth        2.1    2.2

No matter how one views the numbers, Ruth was the better offensive player. The only surprising result is that Cobb was slightly better at driving in runs, which brings up major differences between them.

Ruth drove in many of his runs with the long ball; Cobb did it with singles, doubles and triples.

Ruth scored many of his runs when hit home runs; Cobb put himself into scoring position with stolen bases and extra-base hits.

They are the top two players ever.

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If the majority of fans had their way come spring, Cody Overbeck would be the favorite in-house substitute for Ryan Howard.

There’s options to choose from—from bringing up Overbeck or Matt Rizzotti, moving Utley to first while plugging in Valdez or Martinez at second or moving Mayberry to first and plugging in Domonic Brown in left.

Yet, the fans’ favorite choice could be the worst of the litter. 

There’s no doubt in my mind Overbeck would struggle in the majors. Many of his supporters see his .279/.331/.416 line in just under 250 plate appearances in Triple-A as enough evidence that he can adapt to tougher competition and continue his Double-A success(.275/.331/.532 in 257 plate appearances this year).

However, they fail to look deeper.

Two problems quickly jump out when looking at Overbeck’s Triple-A “success” last year. The first being his batting average of balls in play. It was a career-high .370.

Aside from a similar fluky half to start the 2010 season in High-A ball, his career BABIP has been a much more appropriate .300.

That begs the question: What would these fans think if his BABIP was more realistic?

Let’s give him the benefit of the doubt and assume his true BABIP skill level there is .305 and all of those extra hits were merely singles. His line would come to .235/.290/.371.

That’s not as impressive. 

The other major problem for Major League success are his strikeout and walk rates. Guys who strikeout a ton and walk very little don’t often reach the majors. If they do, they do not last long.

Last year Overbeck struck out 27.2 percent of the time while walking just 4.9 percent of the time. That strikeout-to-walk ratio was seventh worst in the International League.

Players with those numbers simply do not do well in the majors. Players in the Major League last year (among 150 plate appearances), who struck out five times for every walk had an average OPS of .632.

Their wOBA was an average .276 and wRC+ was 70, meaning they were about 30 percent worse than an average major league player. For Phillies fans, this is the kind of output Wilson Valdez gives you offensively.

Putting such a player at first base, where hitting is at a premium, is a huge mistake. 

It’s a common theme in his career that he struggles with plate control and power in his stints at a particular level. In his first season at High-A ball, he walked just under 6 percent of the time while striking out over 27 percent. His power was not there either, with a .169 isolated slugging percentage.

The next year at the same level, he improved dramatically. He increased his walk rate to over 11 percent while cutting his strikeouts to 21 percent with a .251 isolated slugging. 

His two years at Double-A showed the same trend. In his second year at Reading, he dropped his strikeout-rate from 27 percent to less than 23 percent. He increased his isolated slugging from .182 to .258.

Relying on Overbeck to improve or provide adequate offense replacing Howard in the majors, would be a huge mistake. 

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When the “experts” compared Mickey Mantle to Willie Mays, the first thing they mentioned was each player’s batting average. Then they compared the number of home runs each player hit and that was usually followed by comparing their slugging averages. Finally, RBI totals and runs scored were cited.

Mantle struck out much more than Mays, which was considered a tremendous negative. Mantle walked much more than Mays, but on base average didn’t become an official statistic until 1984.

After each had retired, Mays was generally considered the greater offensive player, although it was generally conceded that when he was healthy, as he was for most of 1956, Mantle more than held his own against Mays.

In 2011, a player’s offensive abilities are measured differently from the days of Mantle and Mays.

Many of the recently created modern statistics fail to account for many variables and some might even be based on faulty premises, but they have made Mantle into a better offensive player than Mays, so more power to them.

Batting average is much less important today than it was when Mantle and Mays were active.

Mantle finished at .298. Mays finished at .302.  However, American Leaguers batted .256 during Mantle’s career while National Leaguers hit .264 during Mays’ career. Mantle hit 42 points higher than the league average. Mays batted 38 points above the league average. Of course, during the 1950s, the National League had many more great black players than the American League. Statistics are great.

Mantle’s career on base average was .421 compared to Mays’ .384. Each had a .557 slugging average.

Mantle’s best single-season slugging averages were .705 in 1956, .687 in 1961 and .665 in 1957. Mays’ best were .667 in 1954, .659 in 1955 and .645 in 1965.

Do you think they were pretty good hitters?

The most home runs Mantle hit in a season was 54 in 1961. Mays’ single-season high was 52 in 1965.

Now let’s go to the new measurements.

WAR, or Wins Above Replacement, purports to determine the number of wins a player added to the team above what a replacement player would add. A WAR value greater than eight is considered MVP quality and a value greater than five is All-Star quality.

Mantle’s top WAR values are 12.9, 12.5 and 11.9. Mays’ best are 11.0, 10.6 and 10.4.

Mays played for 19 full seasons. In 1952 (army), 1972 and 1973, he was a part-time player. Mantle played 16 complete seasons. He missed much of 1963 when he broke his foot in a fence at Baltimore and played in only 96 games his rookie season.

Mays’ career WAR is 154.7. Mantle’s is 120.2.

Offensive winning percentage purports to determine the percentage of games a team with nine of a specific player batting would win, assuming average pitching and defense. Mantle produced an .803 winning percentage compared to Mays’ .748.

Willie Mays was the most exciting player in the game when he wasn’t batting. Mantle was the most exciting batter since the days of Babe Ruth and Lou Gehrig.

On the bases and in the field, few could compare to the excitement Mays brought to the game, but when Mantle stepped into the batter’s box, the possibility of seeing a ball leave Yankee Stadium, the sound of the ball meeting the bat and the chance that Mantle would eschew going for the downs and try to start a rally by dragging a bunt are almost indescribable.

It is fascinating to compare how Mantle and Mays were evaluated when they played to how their careers are evaluated today.

Regardless of one’s preference, few players have been as great as Mantle or Mays.

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Jim Hendry has already gotten the pink slip, so a lot of the venom Cubs fans may have felt is gone. Now, it is time to pick up the pieces and move on. Unfortunately, there are a lot of pieces to pick up. The Cubs have a top-five payroll and stand in fifth place in their division. That alone tells you the kind of analysis that has been done. Furthermore, they haven’t been a factor in the division for several years.

Interestingly enough, this team is not devoid of good players. Quite the contrary, when you look of the number of good players they have, you wonder how they stand in fifth place. This is one of those organizations that consistently makes you scratch your head. Some teams (say the Angels or Rays) make you wonder how they win. With the Cubs, you wonder how they lose. It takes some creativity.

Key Statistics

Team Payroll: 125.0 million (sixth)

Lineup: 17.6

Rotation: 16.6

Bullpen: 18.1

Composite: 17.4

Analysis Score: -11.4

Lineup

The secret to Hendry’s success (if you can call it that) is that he was not terrible in any phase of the game. The problem was that he was just bad enough to field a losing team. Still, fans could point to players like Aramis Ramirez, Carlos Pena, Starling Castro and even Marlon Byrd and say the talent is there. Yes it is, but then there were the contracts for Kosuke Fukodome, Alfonso Soriano and the maddening inconsistency of Geovany Soto.

They weren’t terrible, but they were paying through the nose for mediocre players. Carlos Pena, Aramis Ramirez, Alfonso Soriano and Kosuke Fukodome all made more than 10 million dollars this year. Ramirez may have been the only one who came close to producing on that kind of level. Mind you, I said close. Keeping your job without the benefit of results takes effort. You can’t completely botch moves. They simply have to underachieve enough to the point where the powers that be won’t notice.

Rotation

In reality, the starting staff isn’t really that bad. Sure, Carlos Zambrano has a toxic personality and the contract to match, but you have three solid starters including Randy Wells, Ryan Dempster and the newly acquired Matt Garza. All of them have pitched well even if their collective ERA doesn’t show it. See, the Cubs are currently last in the National League (and all of MLB) in defense efficiency rating (DER). DER is the inverse of BABIP. The Cubs have a .675 team DER this season. That means that their opponents have a collective .325 BABIP this year. So, Matt Garza is the only starter with a sub 4.00 ERA, but with better luck they could have two or three pitchers there.

That’s also one of the ways in which you can underachieve and still keep your job. While they’ve committed the most errors in the league, that doesn’t always have to be the case. It just means the team makes fewer plays. That’s usually due to lack of range. Range is not something casual fans or owners notice. The Cubs could use a serviceable fifth starter but, then again, so could most of the league. What they really need is for Carlos Zambrano to either start earning his money or go away.

Bullpen

Carlos Marmol has been filthy in the past, but something happened on the way to him becoming the best closer in the National League. He suddenly became hittable. Andrew Cashner was supposed to be the heir apparent, but he got hurt and has been ineffective. Sean Marshall, Kerry Wood and Jeff Samardzija have been fine, but none are good enough to hold down the closer’s spot in Marmol’s stead. So, they have been stuck with his inconsistent performance.

Response to Crisis

The Cubs were out of it before the season got going and Hendry was out too as it turned out. So, the main crisis is how the organization is going to move forward. They traded Fukodome to Cleveland, but that just cleared a few million dollars. Alfonso Soriano and Carlos Zambrano are signed long-term. Zambrano will clear the books after next season and Soriano will clear after 2014. Finding takers for them would be ideal, but they are going to have to get someone drunk to do it.

Part of the crisis will be to avoid the temptation to spend their way out of the mess. Carlos Pena is a free agent, so they have his money and the money dedicated to Fukodome clearing the books. The temptation is there to go after Albert Pujols or Prince Fielder. Neither of them will be enough to take the Cubs anywhere. They would energize the fan base, but this fan base needs winning more than glitz.

Analysis Score: -11.4 (29th)

Final Analysis

Actually, this rank seems pretty close. The only thing that remains a mystery is why it took ownership so long to pull the plug on Hendry. The emperor had no clothes and was running around in the buff for several seasons. Chicago is an intriguing job, so chances are they will attract a big name. Don’t be surprised if that guy gets this team competitive in a hurry.

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The 2011 campaign was supposed to be a better year for the Orioles. Andy MacPhail is on the hot seat and may not return. Of course, we have to remember that analysis and performance is not the same thing. When we look at analysis, we go back further than 2011. We look at performance going back to 2007 and sometimes further. Sometimes players just have down seasons and sometimes they get hurt without warning.

It is hard to look at the Orioles and feel good about what they have done so far. The organization feels like an Etch-a-Sketch that seems to get partially erased every couple of seasons. Nothing seems to be sustained and so they are looking up at their rivals for another season. Furthermore, there is nothing on the horizon to make you think that won’t be the case in 2012.

Key Statistics

Team Payroll: $85.3 million (18th)

Lineup: 11.4

Starting Rotation: 22.5

Bullpen: 17.8

Composite Ranking: 17.2

Analysis Score: +0.8

Lineup

The lineup represents the greatest hope that MacPhail had for competitiveness and where a majority of the payroll rests. He added Vladimir Guerrero, Derrek Lee, J.J. Hardy and Mark Reynolds in the offseason. The general idea was to pair them with established hitters like Brian Roberts, Luke Scott, Adam Jones and Nick Markakis. If everything broke right it would have been a formidable attack.

Some of it was out of everyone’s control. Brian Roberts has been hurt for going on two years. Derrek Lee was not effective and later traded in a salary dump. Furthermore, Nick Markakis and Vladimir Guerrero did not produce the normal numbers they had in the past. Even the consistent Luke Scott went down with an injury.

Out of the group, only J.J. Hardy and Adam Jones produced as they had hoped. Matt Wieters continues to improve behind the dish and at the dish. He represents the direction the Orioles should be going.

Rotation

Again, the performance has been worse than what the analysis dictates should have happened. Unfortunately, managers and general managers usually aren’t judged on the quality of their decisions, but on the results of their decisions. Brian Matusz seemed destined to be a No. 2 or 3 starter before his season devolved into a 1-7, 9.84 ERA disaster.

The same could be said for Jeremy Guthrie. He has the unfortunate role of being the No. 1 pitcher. Going up against the league’s No. 1 pitchers has taken its toll. He is mathematically in the running to lose 20 games. Zach Britton has been solid, but no one in this rotation knocked your socks off this year. The Orioles still have high hopes for Matusz, and it isn’t out of the realm of possibility for him to bounce back next season. Still, there isn’t enough here to make a good rotation.

Bullpen

The Orioles bullpen has been okay. Kevin Gregg is a decent enough closer and they had support from veterans like Mike Gonzalez. Gonzalez was traded to the Rangers before the August 31 roster deadline. Koji Uehara was a revelation and MacPhail did a good job trading him while his value was high. Jim Johnson is also solid in the pen, but right now the pen amounts to Gregg, Johnson and a bunch of crap.

Response to Crisis

It is clear that Andy MacPhail thought he had made enough moves to make the Orioles respectable. I’m not sure that was the right way to go. He really didn’t have any answers for when Brian Roberts, Luke Scott and the young pitchers went down with injuries. It seems the plan was to hope everything went according to plan. He did trade veterans Lee, Uehara and Gonzalez down the stretch. He didn’t net much for any of them, but the financial savings should help some.

Analysis Score: +0.8 (15th)

Final Analysis: There is no way in heck that Andy MacPhail is in the middle of the pack. Even if we assume that everything would have broken right for the Orioles, they would have finished no higher than fourth in the AL East and probably still fifth.

If you add all of the free-agent money together, you get in excess of $20 million. Their payroll could be in the neighborhood of the Blue Jays or Nationals and probably have similar scores for the three phases. He likely will end up being at least in the bottom ten if not the bottom five.

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It is hard to believe that after everything that has gone wrong for the Los Angeles Dodgers this season, after Friday’s game they were only 10.5 games off the division lead.

I know, 10.5 games out of first place seems like a lot, but when you break the season down month-by-month, it really isn’t.

Imagine if the Dodgers could have won just two more games in each of the first four months of the season. If they had done that they would have had 75 wins after Friday’s game. That would put them with two more wins than the San Francisco Giants. The Giants were five games out of first after their game on Friday.

Yes, just two more wins each month in April, May, June and July and the Dodgers would be right in the NL West divisional race.

With six games left against the Giants, and seven games left against the Arizona Diamondbacks, the Dodgers would not only be in the race for the division lead, their destiny would be in their own hands.

When you look back at the season, there are so many games the Dodgers could have won with just a little better offense, pitching, baserunning and defense. And they only needed to improve by just two games a month.

Sometimes when a team loses a game early in the year, fans don’t worry that much about it. But a loss in April is just as important as a loss in September.

Looking back at each month of the season with this in mind makes you realize how easily the Dodgers could have been right in the middle of the fight for the NL West title.

Just two more wins a month. And imagine where they would be if they had three more wins each month.

I don’t even want to think about it.

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Typically, in the game of baseball, there are positions that are expected to generate a lot of offense, and some that are more defensive-oriented with little power threat.

In general, the latter positions are usually second base, shortstop, center field and catcher. But the corner infield and outfield positions have historically produced higher offensive numbers. But, so far in 2011, one position has neglected that precedent—third base.

Some examples for this power outage are injury-related, some are due to aging athletes playing past their prime, and some are just anomalies. But whatever the reason, many teams around baseball have had poor power numbers from their hot corner patrols.

Case in point: Last season, Major League third basemen combined to hit .263 with 567 home runs, to go along with a .418 slugging percentage. In 2009, they totaled 588 home runs, and slugged at a .421 mark.

But so far in 2011, third baseman have hit just 146 home runs (just five more than ML second basemen), with a .245 batting average and a .368 slugging percentage.

We can take a look at some individual performances to truly get to the bottom of this head scratcher. For instance, two of the game’s brightest third baseman over the past five or six seasons have been sidelined much of the year with injuries.

The Washington Nationals’ Ryan Zimmerman has appeared in just eight games in 2011, and none since injuring himself on April 9. Zimmerman has been on the 15-day disabled list ever since, suffering from a torn abdominal muscle. He is currently on a rehab assignment, but no definitive timetable has been established for his return to the lineup.

Mets’ third baseman, and good friend of Zimmerman’s, David Wright is also sidelined on the disabled list. Wright suffered a stress fracture in his back while making a defensive play against the Astros on April 19. A month later, he was placed on the disabled list, and is now expected to be sidelined until some point in July.

The Rays’ Evan Longoria played the first two games of the season, and then missed a month due to an oblique injury. Since his return on May 3, Longoria has just four home runs and a .244 batting average. He endured a span of 56 at-bats without a long ball earlier this year, and just hasn’t been able to find a groove at the plate so far.

There are some third baseman that are overall healthy, but just haven’t produced to their precedent standards.

For instance, Cubs’ third baseman Aramis Ramirez has averaged 28 home runs per season from 2001-2010. So far in 2011, he has three—and he hit his second and third each with the last 10 days. He does have a respectable .288 batting average on the season, but so far his offensive stats resemble more of a middle infielder than a third baseman.

Scott Rolen has just two home runs so far in 2011 and a .245 batting average. He missed about 19 games for the Reds earlier this year with a neck injury, but at 36 years of age, Rolen’s days as an offensive threat could be close to over.

Similarly, Chipper Jones could be nearing the end as well. He has just six home runs on the year, and his slugging percentage is 100 points lower than his career mark.

After a 23-home run campaign in 2010, the Brewers’ Casey McGehee has struggled much of 2011. He has just four home runs on the year to go along with a paltry .227 batting average.

There are also some teams that don’t currently have a legitimate, typical third baseman. The Florida Marlins, for instance, have used a combination of Emilio Bonifacio, Wes Helms and Greg Dobbs to man the hot corner. And though they are all professional hitters, none of them have the proven ability to smash 20-plus home runs on a consistent basis.

The same holds true for the Angels (Alberto Callaspo), Indians (Jack Hannahan), Diamondbacks (Ryan Roberts) and the Royals (Wilson Betemit).

The Toronto Blue Jays are a team worth highlighting. They have the game’s best home run hitter over the last season and a half playing right field, when he has spent much time at third base in his career.

Jose Bautista hit an MLB-best 54 home runs a year ago, and is once again leading the world in big flies with 20. And though he’s played over 350 games at third base, the Jays are content in letting Jayson Nix and Edwin Encarnacion (who have combined to hit six home runs all year) waste away at third base.

Of course, not every Major League third baseman is having a poor season. Adrian Beltre is certainly proving his worth to the Texas Rangers, who signed him to a blockbuster five-year, $80 million contract this past winter. Alex Rodriguez, Kevin Youkilis and Placido Polanco all have quality seasons so far in 2011.

There may be a shift coming in Major League Baseball. Several perennial third base All-Stars are now past their primes and have shown serious decline in offensive production. A new generation of hot corner patrol is on it’s way (witness Mike Moustakas’ debut for the Kansas City Royals Friday night).

Bottom line, if the All-Star game was today, who would you choose to be play third base for either league? The choices this year seem to be awfully thin…perhaps the thinnest the game has seen in the last decade.

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